From: Mark Crispin Miller <[log in to unmask]>
Since it contributed so much to the portrayal of Putin as "an evil
man," we need to raise awareness of the problems
with that story, as long as such an effort is still possible.
(Where are the Skripals, anyway )
MCM
Briefing Note: Update on the Salisbury poisonings
<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-update-on-the-salisbury-poisonings>http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-update-on-the-salisbury-poisonings
The following briefing note is developed by academics researching the
use of chemical and biological weapons during the 2011-present war in
Syria. The note reflects work in progress. However, the substantive
questions raised need answering, especially given the seriousness of
the political situation in the Middle East and UK-Russian relations.
We welcome comments and corrections.
Authors: Professor Paul McKeigue, Professor David Miller and
Professor Piers Robinson ([log in to unmask])
Working Group on Syria, Media and Propaganda
(<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/>syriapropagandamedia.org).
Key points
* The Skripals were exposed to a phosphoroamidofluoridate
compound named A-234, of high purity indicating that it was most
likely prepared for research purposes.
* A-234 or similar compounds have been synthesized at bench scale
by national chemical defence labs in Russia and the US in the 1990s,
and more recently in Iran and Czech. A small quantity of A-234 from a
Russian state lab was used in the murder of Ivan Kivelidi and Zara
Ismailova in 1995.
* No data on the toxicity of A-234 are available in the public
domain. The police statement that the Skripals were exposed through
contact with their front door is implausible as there are no known
nerve agents that cause onset of symptoms delayed by several hours,
and it is improbable that absorption through the skin would cause
both individuals to collapse later at exactly the same time.
* Although Russia is one of several countries that have
synthesized A-234 or similar compounds, there is no evidence other
than Vil Mirzayanov's story that these compounds were ever developed
(implying industrial-scale production and testing of munitions) for
military use. Mirzayanov's credibility as an independent
whistleblower is undermined by his role in a Tatar separatist
movement during 2008-2009, backed by the US State Department.
* There are multiple indications that the UK is hiding information:-
* the withholding of the identity of the compound as A-234.
For example, the
<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/osce-statement-on-nerve-agent-attack-in-salisbury-wiltshire>UK
statement to the OSCE 12 April 2018 states only that 'the name and
structure of that identified toxic chemical is contained in the fall
classified report to States Parties'.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/novichok-nerve-agent-use-in-salisbury-uk-government-response>See
also this briefing. The Chief Executive of Porton Down,
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/salisbury-poisoning-russia-novichok-nerve-agent-porton-down-proof-evidence-mod-latest-a8286761.html>in
his statement 3 April, referred to the compound only as 'Novichok'.
* the withholding of information about its toxicity
* the issue of a Defence and Security Media Advisory notice
on the identity of Skripal's MI6 handler and the attempt to conceal
or deny his role in Orbis Business Intelligence.
* the sequestration of Yulia Skripal.
* The UK government's case against Russia, stated in a letter to
NATO, is based on asserting that "only Russia has the technical
means, operational experience and motive for the attack on the
Skripals". Each of these points is open to question:-
* Technical means: it is not seriously disputed that
compounds such as A-234 can be produced at bench scale in any modern
chemistry lab.
* Operational experience: it is alleged that Russia has a
track record of state-sponsored assassination, but this is not enough
to support the assertion that "only Russia" could have enough
experience to attempt unsuccessfully to assassinate two unprotected
individuals.
* Motive: No other attempted assassinations of defectors from
Russian intelligence services have been recorded. Even if such an
assassination campaign had been ordered, the Russian state would have
good reasons not to initiate it in the first half of 2018. In
contrast there are obvious possible motives (outlined below) for
other actors to have taken steps to silence Sergei Skripal at this time.
What was the agent used
An early report that the hospital was dealing with
<https://www.clinicalservicesjournal.com/story/25262/response-unit-called-as-salisbury-hospital-declares-major-incident>poisoning
caused by an opiate such as fentanyl was most likely based on the
initial working diagnosis. Signs of organophosphate poisoning --
constricted pupils, vomiting, reduced consciousness and reduced
breathing -- couuld easily be mistaken for opiate overdose, usually a
more likely diagnosis. OPCW has stated that the BZ detected by the
Swiss Federal Institute for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Protection in one of the samples sent by OPCW was not from Salisbury
but was in a
<https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-59/en/ecm59dg01_e_.pdf>control
sample.
The <https://rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/6481>Russian
a<https://rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/6481>mbassador reported that on 12
March the Foreign Secretary had told him that the nerve agent used
against Mr and Ms Skripal had been identified as A-234. The
<https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2018/en/s-1612-2018_e_.pdf>OPCW
report issued on 12 April did not identify the agent but stated that
they had confirmed the identification made by the UK and that this
identification had been included in the confidential report provided
to "States parties". On 14 April the Russian Foreign Minister
<http://www.mid.ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/3169545>stated
that A-234 had been reported by the Swiss Federal Institute for
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection that was one of the four
accredited labs used by OPCW to analyse the Salisbury samples.
Based on public reports, a
<http://www.chemspider.com/Chemical-Structure.648087>ChemSpider
record for A-234 has been created which assigns it the IUPAC name
ethyl [(1E)-1-(diethylamino)ethylidene] phosphoramidofluoridate. Its
predicted vapour pressure is very low indicating that it is predicted
to be non-volatile. No information on its stability is available. The
OPCW director Uzumcu
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/europe/opcw-salisbury-novichok-skripal.html>stated
in a newspaper interview that the agent "seems to be very
persistent," and "not affected by weather conditions". This was
confirmed the next day by an OPCW press statement that: "the chemical
substance found was of high purity, persistent and resistant to
weather conditions". Ian Boyd, the chief scientific adviser at the
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, was
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/apr/19/scientists-warn-of-nerve-agent-potency-as-salisbury-clean-up-begins>reported
to have stated: "The chemical does not degrade quickly. You can
assume it is not much different now from the day it was distributed".
No experimental studies of the stability of A-234 have been reported.
Who could have produced A-234 in bench-scale quantities
It is no longer seriously disputed that,
<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/update-to-briefing-note-doubts-about-novichoks>as
noted in our earlier briefing, any well equipped university lab can
synthesize and purify such chemicals at bench scale. OPCW
r<https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2018/en/s-1612-2018_e___1_.pdf>eported
that the agent (presumably A-234) was of high purity with "almost
complete absence of impurities". This suggests that it was from a
batch that had been synthesized for research, rather than for
assassination purposes where it would be unnecessary to purify the agent.
Uzumcu stated in an
<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/europe/opcw-salisbury-novichok-skripal.html>interview
with the New York Times that he had been told by UK officials that
50-100 grams of the agent was used.
"For research activities or protection you would need, for instance,
five to 10 grams or so, but even in Salisbury it looks like they may
have used more than that. Without knowing the exact quantity, I am
told it may be 50, 100 grams or so, which goes beyond
<https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/Research>research activities for
protection"
OPCW quickly contradicted this in a
<https://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-spokespersons-statement-on-amount-of-nerve-agent-used-in-salisbury/>statement
that "OPCW would not be able to estimate or determine the amount of
the nerve agent that was used in Salisbury on 4 March 2018. The
quantity should probably be characterized in milligrams".
Who has studied A-234 or similar compounds
Bench-scale research on the toxicity of agents that might be used in
chemical warfare is entirely legitimate under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and does not have to be declared to OPCW.
* Russia
Since our
<http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/update-to-briefing-note-doubts-about-novichoks>last
briefing note, more
<https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/04/02/76026-otritsanie-novichka>material
from the investigation of the Kivelidi poisoning has been published
by Novaya Gazeta, updating the earlier
<https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/03/22/75896-rezhim-novichka>article
published on 22 March. The second article includes an image of the
mass spectrometry profile of the sample recovered from the telephone
handset, which matches that submitted by Edgewood to the NIST98 mass
spectrometry database. The Russian experts who commented on the
original result appear not to have had access to the mass
spectrometry profile of A-234, and to have incorrectly reconstructed
the structure from a best guess, based on the mass-charge ratios of
the fragments, as something like the GV agent (both agents have
molecular mass 224 daltons, and a 58-dalton fragment). This
establishes that Russia had synthesized this compound at bench scale
by the mid 1990s, but does not confirm that it was ever developed for
military use as alleged by Mirzayanov.
* US
A
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/1997/msg00043c.htm>1997
newspaper article refers to a secret US army intelligence report
referring to Russian development of A-232 and its "ethyl analog"
A-234, indicating that the designation of these compounds and their
structures was known to the US by this time. As noted in our last
briefing note, the Edgewood lab submitted a mass spectrometry profile
for A-234 to the public database NIST98, which was current from 1998 to 2001.
A <http://www.freepatentsonline.com/9132135.pdf>patent application
submitted by a US government lab in 2008 mentions "Novichoks", but
examination shows that the structures given for these compounds were
the dihaloformaldoxime structures previously published as supposed
"Novichoks", not the phosphoramidofluoridates published by Mirzayanov
later in 2008. This does not indicate that the applicants were
studying these compounds -- most likely theyy included them to make
their patent as broad as possible.
* Iran and Czechia
A <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/rcm.775>study from
Iran published in 2016 reported synthesis for research purposes of a
compound similar to A-234, differing from it only by the presence of
methyl instead of ethyl groups. In an
<https://www.tyden.cz/rubriky/domaci/zeman-v-tv-barrandov-jed-novicok-byl-u-nas-vyraben-a-testovan_478480.html>interview
with Czech television, President Zeman stated that in November 2017
the related compound designated A-230 was studied at the Brno
Military Research Institute.
* Other labs
The director of Porton Down has
<https://news.sky.com/story/porton-down-experts-unable-to-identify-precise-source-of-novichok-that-poisoned-spy-11315387>declined
to comment on whether Porton Down has stocks of A-234 for research
purposes. The OPCW labs that identified A-234 in the specimens from
Salisbury were most likely matching it against a mass spectrometry
profile in OPCW's Central Analytical Database.
What is known of the toxicity of A-234
No data on the toxicity of A-234 are available in the public domain.
The printout of the entry in the NIST 98 database appears to
cross-reference an entry in the database RTECS (Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemical Substances)but no entry for this compound now
exists in RTECS.
Why was the structure of A-234 revealed
The structure of A-234 was revealed in a book by Vil S Mirzayanov in
2008, some 13 years after he had emigrated to the US with the story
of a secret programme to develop chemical weapons of a class named
"Novichoks". During 2008-2009 the US government, with an active part
for the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was
<https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/67/672048_-os-2009-224-johnson-s-russia-list-.html>encouraging
the development of a separatist movement in Tatarstan. As part of
this, Mirzayanov was declared head of a Tatar government-in-exile in
December 2008. The publication of his book may thus have been part of
an effort to build up Mirzayanov's status as a dissident. His role in
this operation may explain why subsequent discussion of his book by
OPCW delegates was closely
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09THEHAGUE205_a.html>monitored
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09THEHAGUE205_a.html>(<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09THEHAGUE205_a.html>and
discouraged<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09THEHAGUE205_a.html>)<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09THEHAGUE205_a.html>by
the US State Department. Mirzayanov's involvement in this operation
undermines his credibility as an independent whistleblower.
When and where were the Skripals exposed to A-234
<https://rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/6481>A summary of the different versions
on which journalists were apparently briefed by security sources was
given by the Russian embassy:-
-- Thhe Skripals could be sprayed with poison by attackers in the
street (Daily Mail, 6 March, source: "Anti-terror police").
-- The nerve agent could be planted in onee of the personal items in
Yulia Skripal's suitcase before she left Moscow for London. According
to this theory the toxin was impregnated in an item of clothing or
cosmetics or else in a gift that was opened in the house of Sergei
Skripal in Salisbury, meaning Yulia Skripal was deliberately targeted
to get at her father (The Telegraph, 15 March, source: "Senior
sources in the intelligence agencies").
-- The nerve agent could be planted in the air condditioner of the
car of Skripals (Daily Mail, 19 March, source: "Security expert
Philip Ingram").
-- The Skripals could be poisoned through buckwheat that Yulia
Skrripal had asked her friend to buy and bring for her father,
because she had forgotten to pick up the grocery gifts herself (The
Sun, 1 April, source: "British investigators").
On 28 March the police announced that "at this point in our
investigation, we believe the Skripals first came into contact with
the nerve agent from their front door".
Although it is possible that a nerve agent could be prepared in a
formulation that would be absorbed only slowly through the skin, it
is implausible that two individuals exposed through contact with the
front door would have received doses that caused them to collapse
suddenly and so nearly simultaneously that neither had time to call
for help, at least three hours later. It is more likely that they
were attacked shortly before they were found collapsed on the park bench.
Sergei Skripal's link with Orbis: possible motive for murder
In the first few days after the poisoning there were media reports
that Sergei Skripal had been in
<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/5762307/russian-spy-sergei-skripal-mi6-alexander-litvinenko/>regular
contact with his MI6 handler, whose Linked-In profile had stated that
he was a consultant for Orbis Business Intelligence. It appears that
this profile was
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/03/07/poisoned-russian-spy-sergei-skripal-close-consultant-linked/>deleted
by March 7, and a
<http://powerbase.info/index.php/DSMA_notice_7_March_2018>Defence and
Security Media Advisory Notice was issued to caution journalists
against disclosing the identity of this consultant. However at
Skripal's trial in 2007 his MI6 handler had been
<https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/795751>identified as Pablo Miller, and
the link between Skripal and Miller had been
<https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/03/06/a-hundred-grand-and-hundreds-of-betrayed-agents>described
in detail by Russian opposition media on 6 March.
This link between Skripal and Orbis may be relevant to the dossier
compiled by Christopher Steele, the founder of Orbis, containing
derogatory information on Donald Trump's alleged ties to Russia. This
dossier had been
<https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20180129/106822/HMTG-115-IG00-20180129-SD001.pdf>used
by the FBI to apply for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court
order authorizing surveillance of Trump's campaign.
By early 2018 the unravelling of this story was creating serious
difficulties for Steele and for those he had worked with.
These difficulties included a
<https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018-02-06%20CEG%20LG%20to%20DOJ%20FBI%20(Unclassified%20Steele%20Referral).pdf>referral
for criminal investigation by two US Senators, a libel case in the US
against the publisher of the dossier which had led to a
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/gubarev-v-buzzfeed.pdf>court
ruling that Steele should be questioned in an English court, and a
<http://aktivnyye.com/f/20170429/20170403-Gubarev_et_al_vs_Steele_et_al-Steele_defense.pdf>libel
case in England against Orbis and Steele. It is not difficult to
postulate a situation in which the potential for damage to US-UK
relations could have provided a motive for actors on both sides of
the Atlantic to ensure that Sergei Skripal would not be available to
give evidence.
The UK government's position
This was summarized in a
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-from-the-uk-national-security-adviser-to-the-nato-secretary-general>letter
from the National Security Adviser, Sir Mark Sedwill to the NATO
Secretary-General on 13 April 2018. Sedwill's letter made several
assertions that were substantiated only by "intelligence":
* By 1993, when Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it
is likely that some Novichoks had passed acceptance testing, allowing
their use by the Russian military
* Russia further developed some Novichoks after ratifying the convention
* During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of
delivering chemical warfare agents and to train personnel from
special units in the use of these weapons. This programme
subsequently included investigation of ways of delivering nerve
agents, including by application to door handles.
* In the mid-2000s, President Putin was closely involved in the
Russian chemical weapons programme
* Within the last decade Russia has produced and stockpiled small
quantities of Novichoks
Appearing before the House of Commons Defence Committee on 1 May,
Sedwill
<https://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/91d5b6c6-32d5-4778-9018-3a2d48fc824f>(11:39)
extolled the government's reaction to the Salisbury incident as "an
example of the Fusion Doctrine in practice". The
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-capability-review-nscr>Fusion
Doctrine brings other government departments under the National
Security Council with "the introduction of senior officials as senior
responsible owners to deliver each of the NSC's priorities".
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/iraq-inquiry-report_section-42.pdf>Sedwill's
involvement in the preparation of the
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/polq.12252>now
widely discredited dossier 'Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/polq.12252>',
released in September 2002, calls into question his credibility in
making these uncorroborated assertions. The UK government's case as
set out by Sedwill is based on asserting that "only Russia has the
technical means, operational experience and motive for the attack on
the Skripals". Each of these points is open to serious criticism:-
* Technical means: it is not seriously disputed that A-234 can be
produced at bench scale in any organic chemistry lab.
* Operational experience: it is alleged that Russia has a track
record of state-sponsored assassination, but this does not support
the assertion that only Russia has the operational experience for
such an assassination. On the contrary, the failure of the
assassination attempt, against two unprotected individuals, suggests
that the perpetrators lacked the operational experience and
competence that one would expect of state-directed assassins.
* Motive: no other attempted assassinations of defectors from
Russian intelligence services have been recorded. If the Russian
state had decided to begin assassinating these defectors, it is
unlikely that they would have chosen to start in March 2018, just
before the presidential election and three months before the FIFA
World Cup. However, as noted above, it is possible to identify
motives for other actors to silence Sergei Skripal at this time.
Acknowledgements
We thank Professor Rudy Richardson of the University of Michigan for
advice on the toxicology of nerve agents.
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