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RACHEL'S ENVIRONMENT & HEALTH NEWS #792
May 27, 2004
FIERY HELL ON EARTH, Pt. 1
For some time now, I have been searching for answers to a
deeply perplexing question: Why is the United States promoting
the spread of atomic bombs worldwide?
By "atomic bombs" I mean the kind that turned Hiroshima and
Nagasaki into a fiery hell in 1945 -- A-bombs made from
plutonium (Nagasaki) or "enriched" uranium (Hiroshima).
In this series, I will briefly examine the facts, then consider
some of the possible reasons why the U.S. might favor the
proliferation of atomic weapons worldwide.
In at least four different ways, the U.S. is refusing to limit
-- and in some cases is actively promoting -- the spread of
atomic bombs around the globe.
(1) The U.S. is helping foreign nations acquire nuclear power
plants, which everyone acknowledges have provided the basis for
A-bomb programs in India, Pakistan, South Africa, North Korea
and, during the 1980s, in Iraq. In the hands of a willing
nation, nuclear power equals nuclear weapons.
(2) The U.S. is dragging its feet in achieving its stated goal
of preventing theft of nuclear weapons within the former Soviet
(3) The U.S. is failing to retrieve 35,000 pounds of
weapons-grade uranium that the U.S. loaned or gave to 43
countries during the past 50 years. A crude but effective
A-bomb requires 110 pounds (50 kg) of enriched uranium.
(4) President Bush has ordered a fundamental shift in U.S.
nuclear weapons policies, initiating what the New York Times
calls "the second nuclear age."
These new policies entail (a) creation of a new class of smaller
nuclear weapons, (b) guiding small A-bombs to their targets
from outer space, (c) reducing the time it takes to launch a nuclear
strike, and (d) a new policy of pre-emptive first use of nuclear
weapons even against non-nuclear states.
"It is precisely these kinds of provocative new weapons
capabilities -- at a time when the administration seeks to
prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere
-- that worries even hawkish Republicans," says James Sterngold
of the San Francisco Chronicle.
Let's examine each of these four developments in more detail:
I. Nuclear power = nuclear weapons
The U.S. is urging -- and subsidizing -- foreign nations to
build new nuclear power plants to generate electricity, while
acknowledging that every nuclear power plant certainly provides
the stepping stones to A-bombs.
For example, when Vice-President Dick Cheney visited China in
April, 2004, he was promoting the sale of Westinghouse nuclear
power plants to the Chinese. Current U.S. policy restricts
the export of nuclear technology to China but the Bush
administration is expected to lift those restrictions in
September. The immediate beneficiaries will be Westinghouse and
General Electric. China has already announced plans to build
32 nuclear power plants, and to export the technology to other
countries. For example, China has said it intends to help
Pakistan build two large nuclear power plants capable of
Within the U.S. itself, in recent months two corporate
consortiums have proposed building new nuclear power plants.
President Bush is an enthusiastic supporter of nuclear power.
But nuclear power plants always carry an unspoken danger. For
nations that want to build A-bombs, nuclear power provides the
basis for all that's needed in the way of technology,
opportunity and know-how.
No one disputes this view -- the "nuclear club" has been able
to expand only because the spread of nuclear power plants has
been encouraged and subsidized. Why does the U.S. continue down
As the New York Times wrote recently, "'If you look at every
nation that's recently gone nuclear,' said Mr. [Paul] Leventhal
of the Nuclear Control Institute, 'they've done it through the
civilian nuclear fuel cycle: Iraq, North Korea, India,
Pakistan, South Africa. And now we're worried about Iran.' The
moral, he added, is that atoms for peace can be 'a shortcut to
atoms for war.'"
The Times goes on, "Today, with what seems like relative ease,
scientists can divert an ostensibly peaceful program to make
not only electricity but also highly pure uranium or plutonium,
both excellent bomb fuels."
And: "Experts now talk frankly about a subject that was once
taboo: 'virtual' weapon states - Japan, Germany, Belgium,
Canada, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Taiwan and a dozen other countries
that have mastered the basics of nuclear power and could, if
they wanted, quickly cross the line to make nuclear arms,
probably in a matter or months." Experts call crossing that
Other nations thought to have the know-how (though not
necessarily the inclination) to cross the breakout line include
Egypt, Syria, Nigeria, and South Korea.
The U.S. is on record as vigorously opposing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. However, U.S. actions to prevent
proliferation are half-hearted and contradictory at best.[1,9]
For example, when U.S. allies break all the rules and export
A-bomb technology, the U.S. looks the other way. Earlier this
year, the world was rocked by news that Pakistan's chief
nuclear engineer, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had sold a "complete
package" of A-bomb technology to Libya, to North Korea, and
probably to Iran. The "complete package" included enriched
uranium, centrifuges for making more enriched uranium, and one
or more designs for A-bombs. Dr. Khan even maintained a
telephone support hotline for his A-bomb customers. It was a
good business -- Dr. Khan reportedly received more than $100
million from Libya alone.
When Dr. Khan's international smuggling network was
discovered, the President of Pakistan, General Pervez
Musharraf, forced Dr. Khan to retire as head of Khan Research
Laboratories, then turned around and gave him an official
pardon, lavished him with praise and gave him the title
"special adviser" to the president. According to the New
York Times, "...some former and current American officials say
there was considerable evidence that General Musharraf was
turning a blind eye to Dr. Khan's activities, which they say
may have involved parts of the Pakistani military."
The Bush administration did nothing. "Although Mr. Bush has
vowed to pursue and prosecute those who spread nuclear weapons
technology, the administration did not criticize Mr. Musharraf
when he decided to pardon Mr. Khan, who ran what now appears to
be one of the largest nuclear proliferation networks in the
Did Dr. Khan provide bomb-grade uranium and nuclear know-how to
Al Qaeda? "It's mystifying that the administration hasn't
leaned on Pakistan to make Dr. Khan available for interrogation
to ensure that his network is entirely closed," writes New York
Times columnist Nicholas D. Kristof. "Several experts on
Pakistan told me they believe that the [U.S.] administration
has been so restrained because its top priority isn't combating
nuclear proliferation -- it's getting President Pervez
Musharraf's help in arresting Osama bin Laden before the
November election," Kristof writes.
Pakistan was not the only U.S. ally involved in selling A-bombs
to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates served as the "key transfer point" for all the
technology Dr. Khan was selling. Just as the Cayman Islands
are known for laundering drug money, Dubai is known for
laundering black-market products like A-bomb parts.
When President Bush learned of Dubai's role in Pakistan's
atomic shopping mall, he again did nothing. As the scandal was
breaking in March, 2004, the Times reported that Lockheed
Martin was proceeding with the sale of 80 F-16 fighters to
Dubai -- apparently a reward to a trusted and valued ally.
Even when wealthy, technically-savvy governments play strictly
by the rules, the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has proven
impossible to control. For example, the Japanese acknowledged
earlier this year that they have lost 435 pounds of plutonium
-- enough to make about 25 nuclear bombs as big as the one that
wiped out Nagasaki in 1945. They know they produced it but they
have no idea where it went.
So long as the U.S. continues to promote nuclear power for
itself and its allies, the fiery hell on earth draws ever
closer and more vivid.
I used to think this problem of "nuclear weapons proliferation"
was the "Achilles heel" of nuclear power -- the uncontrollable
problem that would finally convince the world to stuff the
nuclear power genie back into the bottle and never let it out
I am now wondering whether I had it exactly backwards: perhaps
nuclear weaponry is the main appeal of nuclear power -- both to
those who are buying it AND to those who are selling it. (More
on this in Part 3.)
II. Turning a Blind Eye to Loose Soviet A-Bombs
The U.S. has continually failed to secure nuclear weapons left
over from the cold war in countries of the former Soviet Union.
As the New York Times reported in March 2004, "The bipartisan
[U.S.] program to secure weapons of mass destruction is starved
for funds -- but Mr. Bush is proposing a $41 million cut in
'cooperative threat reduction' with Russia."
"I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used
over the next 15 or 20 years," Bruce Blair, president of the
Center for Defense Information, told the New York Times
recently, "first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets
its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear
There are an estimated 15,000 nuclear weapons in the countries
of the former Soviet Union -- 7,000 of them strategic weapons
plus an estimated 8,000 tactical weapons. Strategic weapons
are the big ones capable of incinerating whole cities. They are
covered by disarmament treaties and so have been pretty well
inventoried. They are also physically large and protected with
several layers of elaborate codes and anti-detonation devices.
It would be extremely difficult to steal one and set it off.
But tactical nuclear weapons are a different story. "The most
troublesome gap in the generally reassuring assessment of
Russian weapons security is those tactical nuclear warheads --
smaller, short-range weapons like torpedoes, depth charges,
artillery shells, mines. Although their smaller size and
greater number makes them ideal candidates for theft, they have
gotten far less attention simply because, unlike all of our
long-range weapons, they happen not to be the subject of any
formal treaty," says the New York Times.
The commonly-used estimate of 8,000 tactical nukes is "an
educated guess," says the Times. Other estimates range from a
low of 4,000 to a high of 32,000 tactical A-bombs. Even the
Russians don't seem to have a reliable inventory.
"The other worrying thing about tactical nukes is that their
anti-use devices are believed to be less sophisticated, because
the weapons were designed to be employed in the battlefield.
Some of the older systems are thought to have no permissive
action links at all, so that setting one off would be about as
complicated as hot-wiring a car," says the Times.
But stealing a nuclear weapon may not be the easiest way for a
terrorist group to join the nuclear club.
Bill Keller, who wrote the eye-opening article, "Nuclear
Nightmares" for the New York Times magazine two years ago,
says, "The closest thing I heard to consensus among those who
study nuclear terror was this: building a nuclear bomb is
easier than you think, probably easier than stealing one."
III. Sluggish Response to Weapons-Grade Uranium
So the third way that the U.S. is promoting the spread of
atomic bombs is by failing to retrieve the weapons-grade
enriched uranium that the U.S. sent abroad during the past 50
Here is the opening paragraph from a New York Times story March,
7, 2004: "As the United States presses Iran and other countries
to shut down their nuclear weapons development programs,
government auditors have disclosed that the United States is
making little effort to recover large quantities of
weapons-grade uranium -- enough to make roughly 1,000 nuclear
bombs -- that the government dispersed to 43 countries over the
last several decades," including Iran and Pakistan.
Why would President Bush fiddle around in the face of a threat
as serious and obvious as this one?
[To be continued.]
 This newsletter was written before the New York Times
editorialized as follows on May 28, 2004:
"While the Bush administration has been distracted by the
invasion and occupation of Iraq, it has neglected the far more
urgent threat to American security from dangerous nuclear
materials that must be safeguarded before they can fall into
the hands of terrorists. That is the inescapable conclusion to
be drawn from a new report that documents the slow pace of
protecting potential nuclear bomb material at loosely guarded
sites around the world.
"The report -- prepared by researchers at the Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard -- does not directly blame the invasion
of Iraq for undermining that effort. It simply notes that less
nuclear material was secured in the two years immediately after
the 9/11 attacks than in the two years before....
"The most plausible explanation is that the administration has
focused so intensely on Iraq, which posed no nuclear threat,
that it had little energy left for the real dangers. Indeed,
the Harvard researchers said that if a tenth of the effort and
resources devoted to Iraq in the last year was devoted to
securing nuclear material wherever it might be, the job could
be accomplished quickly."
 In early June, 1981, Israel bombed a nuclear power plant
under construction in Iraq, asserting that Iraq intended it for
making A-bombs. See Steven R. Weisman, "Reagan Asserts Israel
Had Cause To Mistrust Iraq: Senate Panel Not Convinced," New
York Times June 17, 1981. pg. A1.
 Bill Keller, "Nuclear Nightmares," New York Times May 26,
 James Sterngold, "A new era of nuclear weapons: Bush's
buildup begins with little debate in Congress," San Francisco
Chronicle Dec. 7, 2003.
 H. Josef Hebert, "Cheney to shop Westinghouse nuke
technology to China," Salt Lake City (Utah) Tribune April 10,
 Reuters, "Asian countries in race for nuclear power,"
Economic Times [of India] April 11, 2004.
 "A 2nd Consortium Wants a Reactor," New York Times April 1,
 William J. Broad, "Nuclear Weapons in Iran: Plowshare or
Sword," New York Times (Science Section) May 25, 2004.
 "Editorial: Half a Proliferation Program," New York Times
Feb. 16, 2004.
 David E. Sanger, "U.S. Widens Its View of Pakistan Link to
Korean Arms," New York Times Mar. 14, 2004.
 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Pakistani's Nuclear
Earnings: $100 Million," New York Times Mar. 16, 2004.
 David Rohde and Talat Hussain, "Delicate Dance for
Musharraf In Nuclear case," New York Times Feb. 8, 2004.
 Nicholas D. Kristof, "A Nuclear 9/11," New York Times Mar.
 Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "OpEd: Nukes 'R' Us," New
York Times Mar. 4, 2004.
 Bayan Rahman, "Japan Loses 206 kg of Plutonium," New York
Times Jan. 28, 2003.
 Joel Brinkley and William J. Broad, "U.S. Lags in
Recovering Fuel Suitable for Nuclear Arms," New York Times Mar.
RACHEL'S ENVIRONMENT & HEALTH NEWS
Environmental Research Foundation
P.O. Box 160
New Brunswick, N.J. 08903
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