This rightwing slam at former CIA whistleblower Joe Wilson (printed in
National Review) is, in fact, very interesting reading.
We know that the pro-war crowd is trying to smear the messenger rather than
deal with the message, but in my view this is a very effective and
disturbing article.
I am concerned lest that the antiwar movement fall into the trap of putting
all our marbles around defending the musings of one individual (especially
a CIA operative) and the efforts of a lone prosecutor, however exciting
that might be for the moment.
I've seen this before, how the system in crisis draws all attention onto a
single incident, makes that seem like the total reason for being against
the war, and then reshapes the agenda of the antiwar movement FOR us while
pulling out the rug from underneath, discrediting and despairing us all. So
be forewarned. (In other words, there's something about likeable Joe
Wilson's story that doesn't sit right with me, either. Maybe it's his "CIA
agents for Kerry" politics.)
As for myself, even if there had been evidence discovered of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (i.e., nerve gas, biological agents, nuclear material) --
and there is none, remember -- that STILL would not give the U.S., which
possesses vast stockpiles of such weapons, the right to invade another
country.
I say this because the U.S. government, over George H.W. Bush's signature,
DID send large quantities of "precursors" for making such biological &
chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein to use in the war against Iran
throughout the 1980s, and I for one would not be completely surprised if
some of those "agents" did not turn up SOMEWHERE -- in fact, I'm shocked
that they have not, and wonder what deep cover scam is actually being
played on us. (It would have been relatively easy for the U.S. apparatus to
find, say, a batch of anthrax, West Nile, or brucellosis bacteria and go
"aha!" over it, and I am stunned that they have not "found" or planted any
as of yet, as they have done so often in the past, when it suits them.)
- Mitchel Cohen
Our Man in Niger --
Exposed and discredited, Joe Wilson might consider going back.
<http://www.nationalreview.com/may/may200407121105.asp>http://www.nationalreview.com/may/may200407121105.asp
Joe Wilson's cover has been blown. For the past year, he has claimed to be
a truth-teller, a whistleblower, the victim of a vast right-wing conspiracy
and most of the media have lapped it up and cheered him on.
After a whirl of TV and radio appearances during which he received
high-fives and hearty hugs from the produces and hosts (I was in some green
rooms with him so this is eyewitness reporting), and a wet-kiss profile in
Vanity Fair, he gave birth to a quickie book sporting his dapper self on
the cover, and verbosely entitled The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies
that Led to War and Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity: A Diplomat's Memoir.
The book jacket talks of his "fearless insight" (whatever that's supposed
to mean) and "disarming candor" (which does not extend to telling readers
for whom he has been working since retiring early from the Foreign Service).
The biographical blurb describes him as a "political centrist" who received
a prize for "Truth-Telling," though a careful reader might notice that the
award came in part from a group associated with The Nation magazine which
only Michael Moore would consider a centrist publication.
But now Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV he of the Hermes ties and Jaguar
convertibles has been thoroughly discredited. Last week's bipartisan
Senate intelligence committee report concluded that it is he who has been
telling lies.
For starters, he has insisted that his wife, CIA employee Valerie Plame,
was not the one who came up with the brilliant idea that the agency send
him to Niger to investigate whether Saddam Hussein had been attempting to
acquire uranium. "Valerie had nothing to do with the matter," Wilson says
in his book. "She definitely had not proposed that I make the trip." In
fact, the Senate panel found, she was the one who got him that assignment.
The panel even found a memo by her. (She should have thought to use
disappearing ink.)
Wilson spent a total of eight days in Niger "drinking sweet mint tea and
meeting with dozens of people," as he put it. On the basis of this
"investigation" he confidently concluded that there was no way Saddam
sought uranium from Africa. Oddly, Wilson didn't bother to write a report
saying this. Instead he gave an oral briefing to a CIA official.
Oddly, too, as an investigator on assignment for the CIA he was not
required to keep his mission and its conclusions confidential. And for the
New York Times, he was happy to put pen to paper, to write an op-ed
charging the Bush administration with "twisting," "manipulating" and
"exaggerating" intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs "to
justify an invasion."
In particular he said that President Bush was lying when, in his 2003 State
of the Union address, he pronounced these words: "The British government
has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa."
We now know for certain that Wilson was wrong and that Bush's statement was
entirely accurate.
The British have consistently stood by that conclusion. In September 2003,
an independent British parliamentary committee looked into the matter and
determined that the claim made by British intelligence was "reasonable"
(the media forgot to cover that one too). Indeed, Britain's spies stand by
their claim to this day. Interestingly, French intelligence also reported
an Iraqi attempt to procure uranium from Niger.
Yes, there were fake documents relating to Niger-Iraq sales. But no, those
forgeries were not the evidence that convinced British intelligence that
Saddam may have been shopping for "yellowcake" uranium. On the contrary,
according to some intelligence sources, the forgery was planted in order to
be discovered as a ruse to discredit the story of a Niger-Iraq link, to
persuade people there were no grounds for the charge. If that was the plan,
it worked like a charm.
But that's not all. The Butler report, yet another British government
inquiry, also is expected to conclude this week that British intelligence
was correct to say that Saddam sought uranium from Niger.
And in recent days, the Financial Times has reported that illicit sales of
uranium from Niger were indeed being negotiated with Iraq, as well as with
four other states.
According to the FT: "European intelligence officers have now revealed that
three years before the fake documents became public, human and electronic
intelligence sources from a number of countries picked up repeated
discussion of an illicit trade in uranium from Niger. One of the customers
discussed by the traders was Iraq."
There's still more: As Susan Schmidt reported back on page A9 of
Saturday's Washington Post: "Contrary to Wilson's assertions and even the
government's previous statements, the CIA did not tell the White House it
had qualms about the reliability of the Africa intelligence."
The Senate report says fairly bluntly that Wilson lied to the media.
Schmidt notes that the panel found that, "Wilson provided misleading
information to the Washington Post last June. He said then that he
concluded the Niger intelligence was based on a document that had clearly
been forged because 'the dates were wrong and the names were wrong.'"
The problem is Wilson "had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge
of what names and dates were in the reports," the Senate panel discovered.
Schmidt notes: "The documents purported sales agreements between Niger
and Iraq were not in U.S. hands until eight months after Wilson made his
trip to Niger."
Ironically, Senate investigators found that at least some of what Wilson
told his CIA briefer not only failed to persuade the agency that there was
nothing to reports of Niger-Iraq link his information actually created
additional suspicion.
A former prime minister of Niger, Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, told Wilson that
in June 1999, a businessman approached him, insisting that he meet with an
Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations." Mayaki,
knowing how few commodities for export are produced by impoverished Niger,
interpreted that to mean that Saddam was seeking uranium.
Another former government official told Wilson that Iran had tried to buy
400 tons of uranium in 1998. That's the same year that Saddam forced the
weapons inspectors to leave Iraq. Could the former official have meant Iraq
rather than Iran? If someone were to try to connect those dots, what
picture might emerge?
Schmidt adds that the Senate panel was alarmed to find that the CIA never
"fully investigated possible efforts by Iraq to buy uranium from Niger
destined for Iraq and stored in a warehouse in Benin."
I was the first to suggest, here on National Review Online a year ago
("Scandal!" and "No Yellowcake Walk"), that Wilson should not have been
given this assignment, that he had no training or demonstrated competence
as an investigator, that his inquiry had been obviously superficial and
that, far from being a "centrist," he was a partisan with an ax to grind.
But my complaint was really less with Wilson than it was with the CIA for
sending him, rather than an experienced spy or investigator, to check out
such an important and sensitive matter as whether one of the world's most
vicious killers had been trying to buy the stuff that nuclear weapons are
made of.
For this, I received a couple of dishonorable mentions in Wilson's memoir.
He has a chapter called "What I Didn't Find in Africa," which might be used
as a case study for CIA trainees and others who need to understand the
fundamental principle of logic that "the absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence." In other words, Wilson fails to grasp that because he
didn't find proof that Saddam was seeking African uranium does not mean
that proof was not there to be found.
In reaction to his "fearless candor" and "disarming insight" about the
"sixteen-word lie," Wilson writes that "right-wing hatchet men were being
wheeled out to attack me. More ominously, plots were being hatched in the
White House that would betray America's national security.
He writes: "Clifford May was first off the mark, spewing uninformed vitriol
in a piece in National Review Online blindly operating on the principle
that facts, those pesky facts, just do not matter."
Well, facts, those pesky facts do matter and a bipartisan Senate
investigative committee has now established that Wilson has had very few in
his possession. And, for the record, I was never advised anything about
Wilson by anyone serving in the White House, the administration, or the
Republican party. I never even had a discussion about him with such folks.
There is much more that could be said about the Wilson affair, and
certainly many questions that ought to be both asked and answered. But in
the interest of time and space, let me leave you with just one: Now that we
know that Mrs. Wilson did recommend Mr. Wilson for the Niger assignment,
can we not infer that she was working at CIA headquarters in Langley rather
than as an undercover operative in some front business or organization
somewhere?
As I suggested in another NRO piece (Spy Games), if that is the case if
she was not working undercover and if the CIA was not taking measures to
protect her cover no law was broken by columnist Bob Novak in naming her,
or by whoever told Novak that she worked for the CIA.
It is against the law to knowingly name an undercover agent. It is not
against the law to name a CIA employee who is not an undercover agent. For
example, I know the identity of "Anonymous," the CIA employee who has now
written a book trashing the Bush administration for its policies. But since
he is not to the best of my knowledge a covert operative, I would be
committing no crime were I to name him in this piece. Nor, I should add,
did he attempt to hide his employment when we sat across a dinner table
some months ago.
I don't think Joe Wilson is an evil man. I do think he is an angry partisan
and an opportunist. According to my sources, during most of his diplomatic
career he specialized in general services and administration, which means
he was not the political or economic adviser to the ambassador, rather he
was the guy who makes sure the embassy plumbing is working and that the
commissary is stocked with Oreos and other products the ambassador prefers.
Just prior to the Gulf War, he did serve in Iraq, a hot spot to be sure,
but that was under Ambassador April Glaspie, who failed to make it clear to
Saddam that invading Kuwait would elicit a robust response from Washington.
I doubt that Wilson advised her to do otherwise. I rather doubt she asked.
As he says in his book, she was giving him an "on-the-spot education in
Middle Eastern diplomacy. It was a part of the world in which I had no
experience."
In 1991, Wilson's book jacket boasts, President George H.W. Bush praised
Wilson as "a true American hero," and he was made an ambassador. But for
some reason, he was assigned not to Cairo, Paris, or Moscow, places where
you put the best and the brightest, nor was he sent to Bermuda or
Luxembourg, places you send people you want to reward. Instead, he was sent
to Gabon, a diplomatic backwater of the first rank.
After that, he says in his memoir, "I had risen about as high as I could in
the Foreign Service and decided it was time to retire." Well, that's not
exactly accurate either. He could have been given a more important posting,
such as Kenya or South Africa, or he could have been promoted higher in the
senior Foreign Service (he made only the first of four grades). Instead, he
was evidently (according to my sources) forced into involuntary retirement
at 48. (The minimum age for voluntary retirement in the Foreign Service is
50.) After that, he seems to have made quite a bit of money doing what
for whom is unclear and I wish the Senate committee had attempted to find out.
But based on one op-ed declaring 16 words spoken by the president a lie, he
transformed himself into an instant celebrity and, for a while, it seemed,
a contender for power within the chien-mange-le- chien world of foreign
policy. That dream has now probably evaporated. It is hard to see how a
President John Kerry would now want Wilson in his inner circle. But if he
desired to return to Gabon or Niger I, for one, would not be among those
opposing him.
Clifford D. May, a former New York Times foreign correspondent, is the
president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies a policy
institute focusing on terrorism.
<http://www.nationalreview.com/may/may200407121105.asp>http://www.nationalreview.com/may/may200407121105.asp
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