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in a General Sense the dominant ideology may be common sense (kropotkin's principle of cooperation---if you cooperate, you won't get hurt). 'be a good german'.  
  ethicists are interesting---like ombudsmen for the papers.  in-house approved criticism, allus muted.  (eg every genome project has employed some know somethings (more or less) to sign off on the science (eg selling gene markers for health tests).  its deep, and requires a philoshophy phD module.
  i wonder where those 'don't snitch' t-shirts went---used to be common. 


--- On Wed, 8/4/10, Larry Romsted <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> From: Larry Romsted <[log in to unmask]>
> Subject: Re: The Moral Obligations of Scientists
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Date: Wednesday, August 4, 2010, 11:59 PM
> Mitchel circulated a nice quote from
> Marx some days ago, something like:
> 
> The ideology of the ruling class is the dominant ideology.
> 
> Well, yes, which is why corporate scientists as gerbils
> would be lost
> outside their corporate cages, outside the dominant
> ideology.  Same thing
> for ethicists that never question the assumptions that are
> the foundation
> under their ethical questions.
> 
> So maybe the slogan should be:  Free the youth before
> they become corporate
> scientists.
> 
> I generally feel that when an ethical question appears
> about an issue, one
> should ask "who benefits?" if the issue goes one way or the
> other.  In
> general, one direction (and maybe both) benefit the ruling
> class.
> 
> Resist the dominant paradigm.  Nice tee-shirt.
> 
> Does not mean I have a clue as to what to do next. 
> :)
> 
> Larry
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/4/10 10:40 PM, "Michael H Goldhaber" <[log in to unmask]>
> wrote:
> 
> > It seems to me that scientists acting as advocates is
> now rather widely
> > accepted, provided they don't take that advocacy too
> seriously. I remember
> > when Charlie tried to get students in a graduate class
> he was teaching to
> > agree to think about the possible impact of military
> applications, and the
> > rest of the Berkeley physics faculty was aghast. It
> evidently "violated
> > academic freedom" to get the students to think even
> privately about what they
> > might end up doing. My guess is that in most science
> departments that would
> > still be frowned upon, though it's interesting that
> some have allowed
> > "environmental ethics" to become a respectable
> academic subject. But , as far
> > as I know, not "scientific ethics," unless that could
> be limited to things
> > like plagiarism, rather than the  uses of science
> for war or other repulsive
> > ends.   Still, since one of the rules I
> live by is "never trust an ethicist,"
> > perhaps that isn't all bad.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Michael
> > 
> > On Aug 4, 2010, at 4:08 PM, Charles Schwartz wrote:
> > 
> >> How sweet!
> >> 
> >> I remember in the late 1960's, trying to raise
> this very issue within the
> >> American Physical Society, there was a published
> letter of opposition from
> >> Edward Teller. He said that physicists' moral
> obligation was to do good
> >> physics and leave advocacy to others. EDWARD
> TELLER, the most politically
> >> influential scientist of the 20th century.
> >> 
> >> Charlie
> >> 
> >> Phil Gasper wrote:
> >>> Totally banal, but this now seems to be the
> mainstream debate and at least
> >>> these guys are on the right side. --PG
> >>> 
> >>> http://chronicle.com/article/The-Moral-Obligations-of/123725/
> >>> 
> >>> August 1, 2010
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>>  The Moral Obligations of Scientists
> >>> 
> >>> By John A. Vucetich and Michael P. Nelson
> >>> 
> >>> To advocate, or not to advocate? That question
> is one of the most basic
> >>> ethical dilemmas facing environmental
> scientists today, and the answer can
> >>> embody a scientist's relationship with society
> and nature.
> >>> 
> >>> After nearly a century of consideration, the
> issue of whether scientists
> >>> should disseminate and explain their research,
> and aim to influence public
> >>> policy, still fuels heated dispute. The debate
> in general seems at a
> >>> permanent impasse. The various arguments for
> and against advocacy span
> >>> dozens of scholarly papers. Many of those
> involved speak past one another,
> >>> portraying recycled assertions as novel logic,
> often without acknowledging
> >>> equally familiar counterarguments. In May
> 2009, the journal /Conservation
> >>> Biology/ published our extended treatment of
> the topic, "On Advocacy by
> >>> Environmental Scientists: What, Whether, Why,
> and How." For the better part
> >>> of a year, we studied dozens of papers and
> critiqued the strengths and
> >>> weaknesses of each stance for or against
> advocacy. Defining advocacy as
> >>> "promoting, developing, or assessing policy
> positions beyond merely
> >>> conducting research and communicating results
> through primarily scientific
> >>> venues," we found that most positions about
> advocacy boil down to just a few
> >>> classes of formal arguments.
> >>> 
> >>> We also discovered that every argument against
> advocacy was found wanting.
> >>> Specifically:
> >>> 
> >>> *Advocacy could hurt the credibility of
> science or scientists.* Long before
> >>> she knew the legacy of her work, even the
> pioneering environmentalist and
> >>> biologist Rachel Carson endured organized
> attempts by the chemical industry
> >>> to harm her credibility. But significant and
> unjustified damage to one's
> >>> scientific credibility appears exceptional.
> The risk, however, is real
> >>> enough that a scientist would be wise to
> advocate strategically, but rare
> >>> enough that a scientist is not justified in
> refraining from advocacy for
> >>> fear of damaging his or her credibility.
> >>> 
> >>> *Time spent on advocacy takes away from time
> spent on productive research.*
> >>> We never found a published paper expressing
> such a banal sentiment, but we
> >>> suspect that all too often, this suspicion
> lurks just beneath the surface.
> >>> Although it can be challenging, we know how to
> handle conflicting moral
> >>> commitments, such as being a productive
> scientist and an engaged spouse‹we
> >>> just sometimes choose to do otherwise. The
> challenge of time management is
> >>> not an adequate excuse.
> >>> 
> >>> *Science and advocacy are philosophically
> incompatible.* That premise
> >>> appears in various forms. For example: "The
> purpose of science is to assess
> >>> fundamentally objective phenomena, and because
> advocacy is about the
> >>> assessment of normative phenomena, scientists
> should not be advocates."
> >>> Other versions assert that advocacy differs
> from science because science's
> >>> purpose is to remain neutral and
> impartial‹to provide facts or information,
> >>> not policy advice, and to only draw
> conclusions with a relatively high
> >>> degree of certainty. Several dozens of papers
> have been written along those
> >>> lines in the past two decades, and all of them
> mischaracterize science and
> >>> fail to distinguish science from scientists.
> The fact that science is
> >>> primarily about assessing empirical
> propositions does not preclude a
> >>> scientist, who is also an intelligent human,
> from assessing normative
> >>> propositions.
> >>> 
> >>> But the failure of these three main arguments
> against advocacy does not
> >>> create a successful one in favor of it. That
> is a separate task.
> >>> 
> >>> A few general schools of thought support
> advocacy:
> >>> 
> >>> *Science and advocacy are fundamentally
> similar.* A popular premise is that
> >>> advocacy by scientists is acceptable, even
> inevitable, because science
> >>> itself is inherently value-laden. In choosing
> which project to pursue, which
> >>> methods to employ, and how to interpret the
> results of research, scientists
> >>> regularly make ‹indeed, they cannot
> avoid‹value judgments. Although we are
> >>> wise to acknowledge the value of science, we
> commit the fallacy of
> >>> composition if we assume that policy advocacy
> by scientists is justified
> >>> merely on that basis alone. Moreover, while
> advocating for the objective
> >>> analysis of empirical phenomena (i.e., for
> science) or for clear and
> >>> rational thought (i.e., for reason) is
> uncontroversial in all but the most
> >>> extreme arenas, it is also distinct from
> advocating for a given policy.
> >>> 
> >>> *Scientists are obligated to speak out against
> major dangers to society,
> >>> like climate change.* Under certain extreme
> circumstances, this argument
> >>> goes, it is reasonable to expect scientists to
> be advocates. While a
> >>> legitimate stance, such a justification
> arbitrarily limits the role of
> >>> science advocacy to extreme situations. If
> such advocacy were justified on
> >>> the basis of averting societal harms, then
> less pressing but still important
> >>> societal concerns would also allow for
> advocacy by scientists.
> >>> 
> >>> Scientists have a moral obligation first to be
> good citizens, second to be
> >>> good scholars, and third to be good
> scientists. The most powerful argument
> >>> we could find in favor of advocacy holds that
> good citizens in democracies
> >>> have a moral obligation to advocate to the
> best of their ability in the
> >>> interest of helping society.
> >>> 
> >>> It is true that some tension exists between
> advocacy and certain aspects of
> >>> science. Narrowly construed, science focuses
> on the assessment of empirical
> >>> claims, while advocacy focuses on the
> assessment of policy positions that
> >>> transcend only-empirical claims. And yes,
> being an effective advocate
> >>> probably will take away from time that you
> might otherwise spend working in
> >>> the lab, writing papers, or mentoring graduate
> students.
> >>> 
> >>> Still, the commitments to society override
> one's commitments to science.
> >>> When scientists reject advocacy as a
> principle, they reject a fundamental
> >>> aspect of their citizenship. Because of the
> nature and depth of their
> >>> knowledge, they have a special responsibility.
> It is a perversion of
> >>> democracy to muffle the voice of the most
> knowledgeable among us and
> >>> consequently amplify the voice of those with
> the greatest ignorance.
> >>> Silencing scientists who wish to be honest and
> open advocates promotes mob
> >>> rule by special interests. Although some might
> think that scientists have
> >>> inadequate breadth of knowledge to
> appropriately engage in advocacy‹that
> >>> only policy makers and managers should enjoy
> such a privilege‹that logic
> >>> would exclude virtually every citizen from
> advocacy, a prospect as absurd as
> >>> it is dangerous.
> >>> 
> >>> Surviving in today's research-industrial
> complex makes it easy to forget
> >>> that we are scholars first and scientists
> second. While scientists are
> >>> committed to objective empiricism, scholars
> are committed to the rational
> >>> assessment of ideas. That commitment to
> rationality implies‹indeed,
> >>> demands‹a commitment to advocacy. Broad
> participation by scientists in
> >>> advocacy will very likely make for a messy,
> complicated world. That
> >>> complexity is justified if the goal is the
> betterment of society. It is time
> >>> to stop discussing whether scientists should
> be advocates and move on to the
> >>> difficult business of learning how to do so
> wisely.
> >>> 
> >>> /John A. Vucetich is an assistant professor of
> population ecology at the
> >>> School of Forest Resources and Environmental
> Sciences at Michigan
> >>> Technological University. Michael P. Nelson
> holds a joint appointment as an
> >>> associate professor in the departments of
> fisheries and wildlife and of
> >>> philosophy at Michigan State University, and
> in environmental ethics at its
> >>> Lyman Briggs College./
> >>> 
> >>> 
>