From: Mark Crispin Miller <[log in to unmask]>
Since it contributed so much to the portrayal of Putin as "an evil
man," we need to raise awareness of the problems
with that story, as long as such an effort is still possible.
(Where are the Skripals, anyway )
MCM
Briefing Note: Update on the Salisbury
poisonings
http://syriapropagandamedia.org/working-papers/briefing-note-update-on-the-salisbury-poisonings
The following briefing note is developed by academics researching the use
of chemical and biological weapons during the 2011-present war in Syria.
The note reflects work in progress. However, the substantive questions
raised need answering, especially given the seriousness of the political
situation in the Middle East and UK-Russian relations. We welcome
comments and corrections.
Authors: Professor Paul McKeigue, Professor David Miller and
Professor Piers Robinson
([log in to unmask])
Working Group on Syria, Media and Propaganda
(syriapropagandamedia.org
).
Key points
- The Skripals were exposed to a phosphoroamidofluoridate compound
named A-234, of high purity indicating that it was most likely prepared
for research purposes.
- A-234 or similar compounds have been synthesized at bench scale by
national chemical defence labs in Russia and the US in the 1990s, and
more recently in Iran and Czech. A small quantity of A-234 from a Russian
state lab was used in the murder of Ivan Kivelidi and Zara Ismailova in
1995.
- No data on the toxicity of A-234 are available in the public domain.
The police statement that the Skripals were exposed through contact with
their front door is implausible as there are no known nerve agents that
cause onset of symptoms delayed by several hours, and it is improbable
that absorption through the skin would cause both individuals to collapse
later at exactly the same time.
- Although Russia is one of several countries that have synthesized
A-234 or similar compounds, there is no evidence other than Vil
Mirzayanov’s story that these compounds were ever developed (implying
industrial-scale production and testing of munitions) for military use.
Mirzayanov’s credibility as an independent whistleblower is undermined by
his role in a Tatar separatist movement during 2008-2009, backed by the
US State Department.
- There are multiple indications that the UK is hiding information:-
- the withholding of the identity of the compound as A-234. For
example, the
UK statement to the OSCE 12 April 2018 states only that ‘the name and
structure of that identified toxic chemical is contained in the fall
classified report to States Parties’.
See also this briefing. The Chief Executive of Porton Down,
in his statement 3 April, referred to the compound only as
‘Novichok’.
- the withholding of information about its toxicity
- the issue of a Defence and Security Media Advisory notice on the
identity of Skripal’s MI6 handler and the attempt to conceal or deny his
role in Orbis Business Intelligence.
- the sequestration of Yulia Skripal.
- The UK government’s case against Russia, stated in a letter to
NATO, is based on asserting that “only Russia has the technical means,
operational experience and motive for the attack on the Skripals”. Each
of these points is open to question:-
- Technical means: it is not seriously disputed that compounds
such as A-234 can be produced at bench scale in any modern chemistry lab.
- Operational experience: it is alleged that Russia has a track
record of state-sponsored assassination, but this is not enough to
support the assertion that “only Russia” could have enough experience to
attempt unsuccessfully to assassinate two unprotected individuals.
- Motive: No other attempted assassinations of defectors from
Russian intelligence services have been recorded. Even if such an
assassination campaign had been ordered, the Russian state would have
good reasons not to initiate it in the first half of 2018. In contrast
there are obvious possible motives (outlined below) for other actors to
have taken steps to silence Sergei Skripal at this time.
What was the agent used
An early report that the hospital was dealing with
poisoning caused by an opiate such as fentanyl was most likely based
on the initial working diagnosis. Signs of organophosphate
poisoning -- constricted pupils, vomiting, reduced consciousness and
reduced breathing -- couuld easily be mistaken for opiate overdose,
usually a more likely diagnosis. OPCW has stated that the BZ
detected by the Swiss Federal Institute for Nuclear, Biological and
Chemical Protection in one of the samples sent by OPCW was not from
Salisbury but was in a
control sample.
The Russian
ambassador reported
that on 12 March the Foreign Secretary had told him that the nerve
agent used against Mr and Ms Skripal had been identified as A-234.
The
OPCW report issued on 12 April did not identify the agent but stated
that they had confirmed the identification made by the UK and that this
identification had been included in the confidential report provided to
“States parties”. On 14 April the Russian Foreign Minister
stated that A-234 had been reported by the Swiss Federal Institute
for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection that was one of the four
accredited labs used by OPCW to analyse the Salisbury samples.
Based on public reports, a
ChemSpider
record for A-234 has been created which assigns it the IUPAC name
ethyl [(1E)-1-(diethylamino)ethylidene] phosphoramidofluoridate. Its
predicted vapour pressure is very low indicating that it is predicted to
be non-volatile. No information on its stability is available. The
OPCW director Uzumcu
stated in a newspaper interview that the agent “seems to be very
persistent,” and “not affected by weather conditions”. This was confirmed
the next day by an OPCW press statement that: “the chemical substance
found was of high purity, persistent and resistant to weather
conditions”. Ian Boyd, the chief scientific adviser at the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, was
reported to have stated: “The chemical does not degrade quickly. You
can assume it is not much different now from the day it was distributed”.
No experimental studies of the stability of A-234 have been
reported.
Who could have produced A-234 in bench-scale quantities
It is no longer seriously disputed that,
as noted in our earlier briefing, any well equipped university lab
can synthesize and purify such chemicals at bench scale. OPCW
r
eported that the agent (presumably A-234) was of high purity with
“almost complete absence of impurities”. This suggests that it was from a
batch that had been synthesized for research, rather than for
assassination purposes where it would be unnecessary to purify the
agent.
Uzumcu stated in an
interview with the New York Times that he had been told by UK
officials that 50-100 grams of the agent was used.
“For research activities or protection you would need, for instance,
five to 10 grams or so, but even in Salisbury it looks like they may have
used more than that. Without knowing the exact quantity, I am told it may
be 50, 100 grams or so, which goes beyond
research
activities for protection”
OPCW quickly contradicted this in a
statement that “OPCW would not be able to estimate or determine the
amount of the nerve agent that was used in Salisbury on 4 March 2018. The
quantity should probably be characterized in milligrams”.
Who has studied A-234 or similar compounds
Bench-scale research on the toxicity of agents that might be used in
chemical warfare is entirely legitimate under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and does not have to be declared to OPCW.
Since our
last briefing note, more
material from the investigation of the Kivelidi poisoning has been
published by Novaya Gazeta, updating the earlier
article published on 22 March. The second article includes an image
of the mass spectrometry profile of the sample recovered from the
telephone handset, which matches that submitted by Edgewood to the NIST98
mass spectrometry database. The Russian experts who commented on the
original result appear not to have had access to the mass spectrometry
profile of A-234, and to have incorrectly reconstructed the structure
from a best guess, based on the mass-charge ratios of the fragments, as
something like the GV agent (both agents have molecular mass 224 daltons,
and a 58-dalton fragment). This establishes that Russia had synthesized
this compound at bench scale by the mid 1990s, but does not confirm that
it was ever developed for military use as alleged by Mirzayanov.
A
1997 newspaper article refers to a secret US army intelligence report
referring to Russian development of A-232 and its “ethyl analog” A-234,
indicating that the designation of these compounds and their structures
was known to the US by this time. As noted in our last briefing note, the
Edgewood lab submitted a mass spectrometry profile for A-234 to the
public database NIST98, which was current from 1998 to 2001.
A patent
application submitted by a US government lab in 2008 mentions
“Novichoks”, but examination shows that the structures given for these
compounds were the dihaloformaldoxime structures previously published as
supposed “Novichoks”, not the phosphoramidofluoridates published by
Mirzayanov later in 2008. This does not indicate that the applicants were
studying these compounds -- most likely theyy included them to make their
patent as broad as possible.
A
study
from Iran published in 2016 reported synthesis for research purposes
of a compound similar to A-234, differing from it only by the presence of
methyl instead of ethyl groups. In an
interview with Czech television, President Zeman stated that in
November 2017 the related compound designated A-230 was studied at the
Brno Military Research Institute.
The director of Porton Down has
declined to comment on whether Porton Down has stocks of A-234 for
research purposes. The OPCW labs that identified A-234 in the specimens
from Salisbury were most likely matching it against a mass spectrometry
profile in OPCW’s Central Analytical Database.
What is known of the toxicity of A-234
No data on the toxicity of A-234 are available in the public domain.
The printout of the entry in the NIST 98 database appears to
cross-reference an entry in the database RTECS (Registry of Toxic
Effects of Chemical Substances)but no entry for this compound now
exists in RTECS.
Why was the structure of A-234 revealed
The structure of A-234 was revealed in a book by Vil S Mirzayanov in
2008, some 13 years after he had emigrated to the US with the story of a
secret programme to develop chemical weapons of a class named
“Novichoks”. During 2008-2009 the US government, with an active part for
the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, was
encouraging the development of a separatist movement in Tatarstan. As
part of this, Mirzayanov was declared head of a Tatar government-in-exile
in December 2008. The publication of his book may thus have been part of
an effort to build up Mirzayanov’s status as a dissident. His role in
this operation may explain why subsequent discussion of his book by OPCW
delegates was closely
monitored
(
and
discouraged
)
by the
US State Department. Mirzayanov’s involvement in this operation
undermines his credibility as an independent whistleblower.
When and where were the Skripals exposed to A-234
A summary of the
different versions on which journalists were apparently briefed by
security sources was given by the Russian embassy:-
-- Thhe Skripals could be sprayed with poison by attackers in the
street (Daily Mail, 6 March, source: “Anti-terror police”).
-- The nerve agent could be planted in onee of the personal items
in Yulia Skripal’s suitcase before she left Moscow for London. According
to this theory the toxin was impregnated in an item of clothing or
cosmetics or else in a gift that was opened in the house of Sergei
Skripal in Salisbury, meaning Yulia Skripal was deliberately targeted to
get at her father (The Telegraph, 15 March, source: “Senior sources in
the intelligence agencies”).
-- The nerve agent could be planted in the air condditioner of the
car of Skripals (Daily Mail, 19 March, source: “Security expert Philip
Ingram”).
-- The Skripals could be poisoned through buckwheat that Yulia
Skrripal had asked her friend to buy and bring for her father, because
she had forgotten to pick up the grocery gifts herself (The Sun, 1 April,
source: “British investigators”).
On 28 March the police announced that “at this point in our
investigation, we believe the Skripals first came into contact with the
nerve agent from their front door”.
Although it is possible that a nerve agent could be prepared in a
formulation that would be absorbed only slowly through the skin, it is
implausible that two individuals exposed through contact with the front
door would have received doses that caused them to collapse suddenly and
so nearly simultaneously that neither had time to call for help, at least
three hours later. It is more likely that they were attacked shortly
before they were found collapsed on the park bench.
Sergei Skripal’s link with Orbis: possible motive for murder
In the first few days after the poisoning there were media reports
that Sergei Skripal had been in
regular contact with his MI6 handler, whose Linked-In profile had
stated that he was a consultant for Orbis Business Intelligence. It
appears that this profile was
deleted by March 7, and a
Defence and Security Media Advisory Notice was issued to caution
journalists against disclosing the identity of this consultant. However
at Skripal’s trial in 2007 his MI6 handler had been
identified as Pablo
Miller, and the link between Skripal and Miller had been
described in detail by Russian opposition media on 6 March.
This link between Skripal and Orbis may be relevant to the dossier
compiled by Christopher Steele, the founder of Orbis, containing
derogatory information on Donald Trump’s alleged ties to Russia. This
dossier had been
used by the FBI to apply for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
court order authorizing surveillance of Trump’s campaign.
By early 2018 the unravelling of this story was creating serious
difficulties for Steele and for those he had worked with.
These difficulties included a
referral for criminal investigation by two US Senators, a libel case
in the US against the publisher of the dossier which had led to a
court ruling that Steele should be questioned in an English court,
and a
libel case in England against Orbis and Steele. It is not difficult
to postulate a situation in which the potential for damage to US-UK
relations could have provided a motive for actors on both sides of the
Atlantic to ensure that Sergei Skripal would not be available to give
evidence.
The UK government’s position
This was summarized in a
letter from the National Security Adviser, Sir Mark Sedwill to the
NATO Secretary-General on 13 April 2018. Sedwill’s letter made several
assertions that were substantiated only by “intelligence”:
- By 1993, when Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is
likely that some Novichoks had passed acceptance testing, allowing their
use by the Russian military
- Russia further developed some Novichoks after ratifying the
convention
- During the 2000s, Russia commenced a programme to test means of
delivering chemical warfare agents and to train personnel from special
units in the use of these weapons. This programme subsequently included
investigation of ways of delivering nerve agents, including by
application to door handles.
- In the mid-2000s, President Putin was closely involved in the Russian
chemical weapons programme
- Within the last decade Russia has produced and stockpiled small
quantities of Novichoks
Appearing before the House of Commons Defence Committee on 1 May, Sedwill
(11:39) extolled the government’s reaction to the Salisbury incident
as “an example of the Fusion Doctrine in practice”. The
Fusion Doctrine brings other government departments under the
National Security Council with “the introduction of senior officials as
senior responsible owners to deliver each of the NSC’s
priorities”.
Sedwill’s involvement in the preparation of the
now
widely discredited dossier ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction
’
, released in September 2002, calls into question his credibility in
making these uncorroborated assertions. The UK government’s case as set
out by Sedwill is based on asserting that “only Russia has the technical
means, operational experience and motive for the attack on the Skripals”.
Each of these points is open to serious criticism:-
- Technical means: it is not seriously disputed that A-234 can be
produced at bench scale in any organic chemistry lab.
- Operational experience: it is alleged that Russia has a track record
of state-sponsored assassination, but this does not support the assertion
that only Russia has the operational experience for such an
assassination. On the contrary, the failure of the assassination attempt,
against two unprotected individuals, suggests that the perpetrators
lacked the operational experience and competence that one would expect of
state-directed assassins.
- Motive: no other attempted assassinations of defectors from Russian
intelligence services have been recorded. If the Russian state had
decided to begin assassinating these defectors, it is unlikely that they
would have chosen to start in March 2018, just before the presidential
election and three months before the FIFA World Cup. However, as noted
above, it is possible to identify motives for other actors to silence
Sergei Skripal at this time.
Acknowledgements
We thank Professor Rudy Richardson of the University of Michigan for
advice on the toxicology of nerve agents.