https://jacobin.com/2023/04/china-workers-labor-movement-left-state-repression

04.08.2023
Chinese Workers Are Facing Escalating Repression
By Ralf Ruckus <https://jacobin.com/author/ralf-ruckus>

The new working class created by China’s transformation has been learning
how to organize and demand a better deal with help from labor NGOs and
left-wing activists. But a crackdown on oppositional activity under Xi
Jinping has made their job a lot harder.

Employees work on the Honda Civic production line at the automaker’s
Dongfeng Honda factory in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. February 6, 2017.
(STR / AFP via Getty Images)
In the 1990s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the “factory of
the world” for consumer goods. The boom in manufacturing, construction, and
other sectors was built on the vast supply of migrant labor power from the
countryside.

Labor unrest in response to the harsh conditions started with sporadic
strikes in factories and on construction sites as well as short strike
waves in provinces on the east coast and, especially, Guangdong. This
unrest included hidden forms of everyday workplace resistance (sabotage,
slowdowns, and what James Scott calls “weapons of the weak”).

The number of visible workers’ protests increased after 2003. By that time,
migrants had gotten used to the labor regime and industrial work, and some
of them acquired the ability to organize strikes and other forms of
collective resistance.
Migrant Workers’ Struggles

In the first half of the 2000s, most of the demands of the migrant workers’
actions were rather defensive, asking for compliance with labor laws or the
payment of wage arrears. More migrant workers used the legal channels, like
arbitration boards and labor courts, to push through their demands. Still,
the pressure from below on enterprise managements and local authorities was
palpable.

In the second half of the 2000s, migrant workers’ confidence and experience
had grown, and they began fighting for real improvements, not just for
compliance with labor standards. The offensive or more ambitious demands
included wage increases, more respect from managers, better working hours,
and sometimes even collective bargaining or proper worker representation.

Larger migrant worker protests took place, mostly in light manufacturing,
construction, and transportation — sectors that bring workers together on a
mass scale or give them particular disruptive capacities. Workers exploited
the fact that labor shortages in labor-intensive sectors on the east coast,
coupled with high labor turnover, had improved their bargaining power since
the mid-2000s.

Their wildcat strikes were also more disciplined and better organized, with
coordination through informal networks of workers and worker activists
using telephones and internet platforms. The most spectacular strike wave
took place in the auto industry in 2010, starting with a strike of Honda
workers in Guangdong and spreading to other companies and provinces.

The number of labor protests continued to increase until 2015, when it
began to drop slowly. The nature of protests altered, too, with ongoing
sectoral, spatial, economic, and generational changes. Following the
tertiarization of the economy, more service workers — in transportation,
education, banking, and IT, for example — were involved in labor conflicts
than before. And in the wake of the relocation of industries due to higher
wages on the east coast, more protests occurred in central and western
China.

With the slowdown of economic growth, restructuring, and relocation,
workers staged more struggles against redundancies and for compensation.
Due to the aging of migrant workers, many of whom were then in their
forties and fifties, more protests demanded social insurance contributions
(e.g. for pensions). Workers were often better organized and more
proficient in using smartphones and social media. In some cases, they
managed to coordinate across companies, cities, and provinces.
Class Conflict Without Class Language

All of the workplace struggles by migrants were self-organized and
autonomous actions. Strikes are not legally sanctioned or protected in the
PRC, and the Communist Party of China (CPC) does not allow the setting up
of independent labor unions.

In the 1990s and 2000s, the basis of self-organization was often the common
place of origin of migrant workers who came from the same village or
region. In the course of the 2000s, when migrants slowly settled down in
the urban areas, more protests were organized on the basis of common
interests as workers in a particular job, department, plant, or company.

However, when their struggles were spreading in the 2000s, migrant workers
had no clear language to talk about them in left-wing or class terms. In
public debates, the language of class (*jieji*) and class struggle (*jieji
douzheng*) had disappeared in the 1980s, abandoned by the CPC and most
scholars and analysts, to be replaced by a Weberian, bourgeois discourse on
social strata (*jieceng*).

Migrant workers did not even use the term for workers — *gongren *— as it
was still reserved for workers in urban state-owned enterprises. They used
other terms like “working girl/working boy” (*dagongmei*/*dagongzai*) or
“peasant worker” (*nongmingong*) — expressing their insecure and temporary
status in the cities and demonstrating the lack of class language.

In the long run, the mobilizations and struggles of migrant workers have
been successful to a certain extent. On the one hand, workers gained
experiences in organizing strategies and protest tactics; on the other
hand, the pressure from below led to the improvement of their status and
conditions. This was no smooth process, however, and the party-state also
reacted with repression to this pressure.

Under Jiang Zemin’s leadership in the 1990s and early 2000s, when the
Chinese economy was being restructured, the ruling party was often not able
to respond to social unrest in a consistent and planned way and sent in the
police, which provoked more conflicts and even riots. From the mid-2000s to
the early 2010s, the “golden age” of economic boom and rising wages, the Hu
Jintao leadership developed methods of concession and co-optation.
State Responses

For most of the 2000s, for state and private capital, strikes were often
not a big issue: wages were low and the economy was booming, so there was
room for small but continuous concessions. Local or regional authorities
tolerated labor protests as long as they were restricted to one company.
However, strike organizers among the workers were usually dismissed, and
attempts to set up independent labor organizations were rigidly repressed.

Local authorities intervened, repressively or otherwise, when labor
struggles spread beyond company limits, involved clear political aims, or
could not be resolved quickly. They also channeled grievances and conflicts
into institutionalized mediation processes to atomize the workers and
undermine class formation.

By the late 2000s, the state machine was much better prepared to use
policing or political measures. It had gradually developed its repressive
and responsive capacities, with more and better trained police, new forms
of surveillance and online censorship, and new regulations on the activity
of NGOs and other support groups, combined with new labor laws and
structures of arbitration as well as more active organizing by the official
trade union movement.

Since Xi Jinping took over from Hu Jintao in 2012, the authorities have
continued to use institutionalized methods of labor conflict resolution and
control. At the same time, however, they began to use more repression
against social unrest as economic growth slowed down and wage increases
were limited.

Factory closures due to their relocation to the Chinese hinterland or
countries in Southeast Asia combined with problems connected to the aging
of migrant workers resulted in an increasing number of conflicts. The main
issues were redundancies, compensation, and social insurance payments,
which involved large sums of money, at a time when the space for
concessions by employers had narrowed.

Migrant workers were left with fewer options in the 2010s as the state
cracked down on support networks and censored reports on social unrest.
This included the sacking, blacklisting, or even arrest of worker activists
and their supporters.

The new migrant working class and its struggles added to the social
frictions produced by growing inequality and capitalist exploitation. Those
struggles did not lead to the formation of an organized labor movement with
union or party representation, and workers could not build lasting
organizational cores and resources for future struggles. However, they
accumulated important experience of how to organize labor protests that was
passed on.
Labor NGOs

NGOs became popular in China as the state retreated from certain social and
welfare activities following the slogan “small government, big
society” (“*xiaozhengfu,
dashehui*”). Most NGOs engaged in some kind of social or aid work and were
not left-wing or oppositional in their stance. A minority followed an
explicit left-wing political agenda in their support of social struggles
from below.

Witnessing the harsh conditions in Guangdong factories province in the
early 1990s and the first waves of struggle among migrant factory workers,
leftist activists from the PRC and Hong Kong began to discuss forms of
labor support and solidarity. They set up labor NGOs from the mid-1990s on.
Urban intellectuals as well as former migrant workers themselves were among
the founders of these groups.

Some of the labor organizations received financial support from NGOs and
foundations based in Hong Kong or Europe and North America. Most of them
were active in Guangdong province in the south or in and around the capital
Beijing in the north.

Labor NGOs supported migrant workers fighting for compensation after having
suffered work accidents or work-related diseases. They also supported women
workers who needed legal advice and education in their struggle against
harsh working conditions, or migrants who were facing discrimination.

When migrant worker struggles became more widespread and militant in the
late 2000s and early 2010s, several labor NGOs became “movement-oriented”
and recruited worker activists or trained workers in forms of collective
action. In some cases, such NGOs helped to coordinate small, repeated
protests from behind the scenes in the form of what has been called
“disguised collective action” or “mobilizing without the masses” — that is,
launching publicity actions and campaigns on internet platforms while
avoiding the formation of larger organizations.
Political Orientations

There were different political orientations among labor NGOs and other
initiatives supporting workers’ struggles. China Labour Bulletin
<https://clb.org.hk/>, an organization based in Hong Kong with a network of
contacts in the PRC, has pushed a social democratic agenda of independent
unionism and collective bargaining. Some initiatives have involved people
with Trotskyist positions aiming at workers’ education and empowerment or
organizing solidarity inside and outside the PRC.

The strongest ideological influence on labor activists came from
neo-Maoism. There was a generational shift among this oppositional Maoist
left in the late 2000s and early 2010s, as an older generation with roots
in the rebel struggles of the Cultural Revolution gave way to a new cohort
that grew out of an upsurge of discussions and focused on the wave of
migrant workers’ struggles. Leftist debates were spurred on by the
burgeoning use of internet platforms that created more room for exchanges —
at least until state censorship caught up.

There were young student activists identifying as Marxists and/or Maoists
organized in the early 2010s at several Chinese universities. Coming from
urban households and increasingly from migrant families themselves, these
students formed so-called Marxist study groups. They read Maoist literature
and applied it to the new realities of capitalism in the PRC. Some also
began to visit the industrial zones in the south, learning about conditions
and organizing methods.

The activities of Maoist and other leftist groups included undercover
inquiries in factories like those of the electronics supplier Foxconn.
Students also spent time working in factories to support organizing and
strikes. The most spectacular example of such activity came when Maoist
students-turned-worker-activists attempted to organize workers in the Jasic
factory in Shenzhen, a producer of welding machines.

They had little support from other workers, but when the local police
arrested some of the workers and activists, supporters organized
demonstrations and mobilized dozens of students from Maoist groups to go to
Shenzhen and stage protests. The police made more arrests, and state
security agencies began a campaign to suppress the Maoist study groups
across the whole country afterward.

A wave of repression hit not just those involved in the Jasic case itself
but also other activist groups and labor NGOs. The defeat triggered debates
among various leftist currents on the usability of Maoist strategies to
educate and organize workers from the outside.
The Chongqing Model

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, a political split widened between
different currents of neo-Maoism. Some Maoists welcomed the welfare reforms
of Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious Society” and the promise to solve the problems
of peasants through the New Socialist Countryside program from the
mid-2000s.

The so-called Chongqing Model stirred up even more excitement among some
leftists. The CPC leader in the large city of Chongqing in western China,
Bo Xilai, promoted social housing and other welfare measures, a campaign
against organized crime, and a loosening of the *hukou* migration regime.
He supported Maoist folklore or a kind of “red” culture and socialist
nostalgia.

That earned Bo and the Chongqing Model support from part of the New Left
and other Maoist groups. They hoped Bo Xilai would win influence in the
ruling party and push it toward what they understood as a left-wing course.

However, Bo was seen as a competitor for the designated successor to Hu
Jintao, Xi Jinping. The party leadership decided against Bo’s line and
supported Xi Jinping as the next party leader. Bo was eventually arrested
in 2012 and convicted of corruption, which marked the end of the Chongqing
Model.

The debate on the Chongqing Model deepened the split between what have been
labeled as Maoist Left (*maozuo*) and Maoist Right (*maoyou*) tendencies.
The Maoist Left distances itself from the CPC, which it sees as a
capitalist or even right-wing force. It supports struggles from below and
advocates a revolutionary understanding of Maoism.

Within this broad tendency, some favor a more democratic model of socialism
while others continue to support authoritarian forms. There are also those
with an “internationalist” vision of class struggle and those who support
varieties of Chinese nationalism.

The Maoist Right continues to criticize the negative impact of the market
reforms on the working classes in the PRC. However, it holds on to the
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology, supports one-party rule and a strong
state, and hopes to bring the CPC leadership back to a socialist course
from within. In recent years, it has even supported the party leadership
under Xi Jinping for promoting its own kind of Marxism.
Repressive Turn

The ruling party has developed a mixture of different tools to limit
left-wing oppositional activity since its upturn in the 1990s. Local
authorities employed surveillance and other forms of control to restrict
the activity of individuals or groups, especially when they supported
social protests. Labor NGOs were threatened and forced to move out of
certain districts or cities. Leftist websites and publications came under
pressure or were shut down.

Oppositional activities were even more restricted under the new leadership
of Xi Jinping after 2012. Repression against different forms of organized
opposition was intensified, targeting journalists, lawyers, and activists.
While many of these oppositional figures were liberals who were not
involved in left-wing activity, the crackdown on labor activists and NGOs
in December 2015 indicated that leftists were also in the crosshairs of the
state security forces.

On the ideological front, the CPC has promoted its tamed and streamlined
interpretations of Marxism, Maoism, and its own socialist legacy in an
attempt to strengthen its legitimacy. The rejuvenation and redefinition of
Marxism by the party leadership had begun shortly after the CPC allowed
capitalists to join its ranks in the early 2000s. It feared losing
legitimacy and support among workers and peasants.

Under Xi Jinping, the leadership tried to reinforce party rule through both
institutional and ideological reforms. Faced with the slowdown of economic
growth, widespread contradictions within the ruling party and the state
apparatus, and continuing social inequality and tensions, it decided to
tighten its rule through campaigns, purges, and censorship. The repressive
measures were complemented with the re-embrace of leftist rhetoric and
Marxism in the official discourse.

State repression of left-wing initiatives has clearly become preemptive,
trying to prevent any meaningful collaboration of social protesters and
left-wing activists. Neither labor NGOs nor the Maoist student groups have
been able to continue their engagement since the wave of repression began.
It seems that this generation of left-wing activism might have reached its
end.

This is an abridged extract from *The Left in China: A Political
Cartography <https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745342955/the-left-in-china/>*,
available now from Pluto Press.
Contributors

Ralf Ruckus cofounded the collective gongchao.org that investigates and
documents social unrest and movements in China with a focus on the
struggles of workers, migrants, and women. He is the author of The Left in
China: A Political Cartography (2023).